David Quigley
Learning to Live: Preliminary Notes for a Program of Art Education for the 21st Century. Après John Dewey

In an essay published in 2009, Boris Groys makes the claim that "today art education has no definite goal, no method, no particular content that can be taught, no tradition that can be transmitted to a new generation—which is to say, it has too many."[69] While one might agree with this diagnosis, one immediately wonders how we should assess it. Are we to merely tacitly acknowledge this situation or does this critique imply a call for change? Is this lack (or paradoxical overabundance) of goals, methods or content inherent to the very essence of art education, or is this a problem or historical impasse that we must overcome? At the conclusion of the same paragraph, Groys offers an idea that I would like to develop further and argue could serve as a goal for art and art education today:

"Ultimately, teaching art means teaching life."

Beginning with this thought—that art has something to do with teaching us how to live—I would like to propose that it is, in fact, imperative that we reconsider the goals, methods and content of art education—especially as these could be used to redefine our concept of public life. To do this I would like to return to the work of the philosopher John Dewey and to a historical trajectory that explicitly draws upon his theory of experiential art. After briefly introducing this context, I will propose a list of goals, concepts and ideals for a program for 21st century art education derived from Dewey that not only address the situation in art schools, but also show what role art could play in a broader social context beyond the narrow realm of the art world.

Performing Pragmatism: Art as Experience

On the first pages of Dewey's *Art as Experience* from 1934, we read:

*"*By one of the ironic perversities that often attend the course of affairs, *the existence of the works of art upon which the formation of an aesthetic theory depends has become an obstruction to theory about them.* For one reason: these works are products that exist externally and physically. In common conception, the work of art is often identified with the building, book, painting, or statue *in its existence apart from human experience."*[70]

It is precisely this problematization of the art object in favor of a theory of *art as experience* that defined an important tradition of artistic practice and art education during the 20th century. In stressing the experiential quality of art, this tradition argued 'from both sides' bringing art practice closer to everyday life and at the same time valorizing and re-thinking all human activity: to think art in terms of experience but also to think experience in terms of art.

Historically, John Dewey had a broad influence as a philosopher and writer on artists between the 1920s and 1960s. More specifically, Dewey was on the board of the relatively short-lived but immensely influential Black Mountain College, where his thought profoundly influenced the founding director John Andrew Rice, as well as the professors Josef Albers, Merce Cunningham, Robert Motherwell, John Cage, and the poets Robert Creeley and Charles Olson. Unlike other trajectories of the critique of the art object, the Deweyian tradition did not deny the special status of art in itself but rather resituated it within a continuum of human experience. Dewey, as a thinker of egalitarianism and democracy, created a theory of art based on the fundamental continuity of experience and practice, making all socially constructed distinctions permanently open to renegotiation. Likewise, in spite of his frequent reference to the English romantic writers Wordsworth, Coleridge and Keats, he was not a subjectivist. His philosophy of art was rather framed within the pragmatist critique of an idealized subject/object dualism. Consequently, his notion of "experience" was based on the *interrelationship* of the subject and object, where the "live creature" was directly implicated in the world, and art was understood as a conscious process of "interaction" that participated in and constructed both personal experience and social reality. While Dewey ultimately accepted (and in fact worked with) the differences between art and other human activities, and likewise between the fine arts and the useful or applied arts, the differences were a question of degree and not of kind.

Black Mountain College

With its numerous contributions to the field of art, it is easy to overlook that Black Mountain College was not

specifically conceived as an art school. It was rather a liberal arts school with art at the center of its pedagogical philosophy acting as a model for an underlying logic of practice and experience that moved between the humanities, manual labor and the fine and applied arts.[71] When Black Mountain College opened in 1933, it only had 21 students and four faculty members, although it eventually grew to be slightly larger. Still, over its 24 years, fewer than 1200 students studied at Black Mountain College (roughly the same number who studied at Bauhaus).[72] However, as numerous publications and exhibitions since its closing attest, Black Mountain College was, along with the Bauhaus, one of the most influential art education projects of the 20th century—and John Dewey's philosophy was at the core of its mission.

Josef Albers and the Vorkurs

First developed together with László Moholy-Nagy following Johannes Itten at the Bauhaus from 1923 to 1933, then at Black Mountain College until 1949 and at Yale from 1950-1958, Josef Albers's *Vorkurs* has continued to be a reference for art pedagogy in the 20th century. Albers based his course on studies and experiments that were intended to make artists learn "to see directly" through heightening immediate awareness and shedding one's visual and other perceptual habits. But what is often underappreciated is that Albers understood this process of "learning to see" in terms that went well beyond the concerns of design or the visual arts.[73] Not merely an exercise in gaining artistic proficiency, these experiments were both an immediate reaction to the complexity of the phenomenology of perception and an invitation to understand vision in much broader terms:

"If we accept education as life and as preparation for life, we must relate all school work, including work in art, as closely as possible to modern problems. [...] In short, our art instruction attempts first to teach the student to see in the widest sense: to open his eyes to the phenomena about him and, most important of all, to open his eyes to his own living, being, and doing."[74]

Learning to see. Learning to create art. Learning to live. This is pedagogy in critical existential terms. Learning to see for Albers meant learning what it means to be alive.

Après John Cage

John Cage and the countless artists influenced by him, Fluxus, multiple projects of experimental and "expanded" cinema, theatre, dance and performance during the second half of the 20th century began with the assumption that artworks themselves are secondary to the experience of making or participating in the making of art. In the tradition of John Dewey, art was seen as being *neither* purely physical *nor* representational (what is portrayed) *nor* as merely subjective, but rather as part of a process of making, reflecting and interacting within a field of common experience and the physical world. In this tradition, it was not a question of neglecting the artwork entirely, what was important was to stress that the significance of works of art was first and foremost what we do with them and what they do with us, looking at art as a specific kind of interaction between the artist, a community of viewers and the sounds, actions and materials of expression.

Theater Piece No 1

It is appropriate that we do not know what actually happened during the event that has since been heralded as the first intermedia "Happening." We do not know the specific date (the year yes, 1952), whether an actual score existed (perhaps still tucked away in some North Carolinian attic)—we do not even really know its name, and the various recollections about what actually transpired often differ in some important details. *Theater Piece No. 1*, sometimes also referred to as "The Untitled Event at Black Mountain College," nonetheless remains at a nodal point in the history of 20th century art.[75] Set in the dining hall of the College, John Cage stood atop a ladder and held a lecture ('interrupted' sporadically by silence),[76] with Robert Rauschenberg's paintings (The White Paintings) hanging above the audience, Mary C. Richards (translator of Artaud's *The Theater and Its Double*, now known for her philosophy of pottery) and the poet Charles Olson reading various pieces of poetry, Merce Cunningham dancing (together with unnamed dancers) amidst the audience (there is mention of a barking dog following him), David Tudor playing prepared piano and Rauschenberg playing Edith Piaf records on an old-fashioned record player (although there is disagreement about

what records he actually played)—each participant acted at assigned times but doing whatever they wanted. There was a slide projector showing abstract colors and photographs (of trees?) and a movie projector showing various films. All of the sources agree on one thing: There were coffee cups on the audience's seats that were filled with coffee at the end of the performance.

Using chance operations, but also composition and even the choreography of everyday life, *Theater Piece No 1* was as much a ritualized philosophical reflection as it was a performance, with the conditions of experience given a structure from which they could be perceived and appreciated. In Dewey's terms, one could say that the piece was about having an experience (in the singular), which Dewey distinguished from the everyday flow of less clearly distinguishable experiences (in the plural). Having "an experience" implies "demarcation" and "fulfillment" and was very close to what Dewey understood as art:

"A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is *an* experience."[77]

In spite of Cage's insistence on chance and indeterminacy (or, one might claim, because of it), the event emerges as a discrete moment, a uniquely demarcated point in time, a delineated interaction with the material and social world expressed in art—a way of giving form to the fragmentary activities and passing of time in which actions would otherwise not in themselves lead to completion. Above all, *Theater Piece No 1* was a lesson on understanding the interrelationship between perception and construction that underlines both art and experience.

Between 1957–59, after his work at Black Mountain College, John Cage held a series of highly influential composition classes at the New School for Social Research that have come to be thought of as the "beginning point" for a number of different artistic positions and movements.[78] Classwork was based on experiments with chance operations while participants were encouraged to work in different media and in different formats—with discussions following the students' presentations.

Shortly before his death in 1978, while talking about one of his famous historical charts, George Maciunas described the influence of John Cage: "Now for this chart I chose style rather than location because the style is so unlocalized and mainly because of the travels of John Cage. So you could call the whole chart like 'travels of John' like you could say 'travels of St. Paul,' you know? Wherever John Cage went, he left a little John Cage group, which some admit, some do not admit his influence. But the fact is there, that those groups formed after his visits."[79]

Après John Cage was the title of the first Fluxus event in Germany, June 9, 1962 in Wuppertal, (organized by George Maciunas) but could also be thought of in the millennial spirit of traditional historiography: After Dewey, after Cage, after Allan Kaprow, after Fluxus, after George Maciunas, after Dick Higgins, after Wolf Vostell, after George Brecht, after Ay-o, after Carolee Schneemann, after Shigeko Kubota, after Nam June Paik, after Robert Filliou, after Robert Watts, after Daniel Spoerri, after Geoffrey Hendricks…after Henry Flynt:

THE POINT IS NOT GOOD ART
--FULFILLMENT IN FANTASY--
BUT A NEW MODE OF LIFE
WHICH ALLOWS FULFILLMENT
IN ACTUAL LIFE.
SENSIBILITY WHICH IS
NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE MODE OF LIFE
IS MERE ESCAPE.[80]

Après, après, après … art making and art education as experience, art understood as a practice related to reflecting and learning about oneself, through exploring and celebrating the immediate conditions of life: where silence, noise, harmony, line, color, form, movement, words become specific demarcations in time and space out of an otherwise unnoticed and uncelebrated flow of events. Art as a process of becoming aware of the shape, sound and smells of people around us, theirs and our

placement in space, our movements, etc. celebrating this empirical fact in a mixture of technique, philosophical reflection and critical pedagogy, we learn to pay attention to the manifold conditions of the possibility of this experience—philosophically in analysis and joyously in art.[81]

Pedagogy and the Avant-Garde: Allan Kaprow, Robert Filliou and "Fluxus Experience"

In the introduction to Allan Kaprow's collected writings, the editor Jeff Kelley paints a picture of Allan Kaprow reading Dewey's *Art as Experience.* Kaprow "the young, ambitious artist and philosophy graduate student" who "penciled in his thoughts as he read" underlining that "art is not separate from experience… what is an authentic experience?… environment is a process of interaction."

Jeff Kelley continued:

"With these and other scribbles, Kaprow grounds himself in American pragmatism and forecasts the themes of his career."[82]

In Kaprow's Manifesto from 1966 we read:

"Now, as art becomes less art, it takes on philosophy's early role as a critique of life. […] Precisely because art can be confused with life, it forces attention upon the aim of its ambiguities, to 'reveal' experience."[83]

Kaprow's studies of the "process of interaction in an environment" were not only artistic statements, they were also guidelines for exploring and constructing the conditions of life.

In Robert Filliou's *Teaching and Learning as Performing Arts* we find a similar approach that develops out of a growing consciousness about the philosophical and broad educational implications of new techniques developing in the arts:

"The purpose of this study is to show how some of the problems inherent in teaching and learning can be solved—or let's say eased—through an application of the participation techniques developed by artists in such fields as: happenings, events, action poetry, environments, visual poetry, films, street performances, non-instrumental music, games, correspondences, etc."[84]

Teaching and Learning as Performing Arts includes interviews with Allan Kaprow, John Cage and Joseph Beuys. It could be thought of as a textbook for a radical pragmatist philosophy (or perhaps an anthropology) of art as education (and education as art). Filliou began with the most basic and obvious human activities, and then transposed them into different intellectual and emotional contexts. The lecture-performance *Teaching and Learning As Performing Arts Part II: Travelin' Light - It's a Dance, Really* (1979) made while shaving himself or before that *Whispered History of Art* (1963) are good examples of how his art and teaching practice moved between genres and modes of expression, where irony, humor, existential awareness and philosophical reflection (and reverie) comingle.

In her book *Fluxus Experience*, which closely follows the line passing from John Dewey to Fluxus artists, Hannah Higgins describes this mixture of art practice and pedagogical project as promoting "experiential learning, but also interdisciplinary exploration, self-directed study, collective work, and the non-hierarchical exchange of ideas. Finally, by fostering such freedom, it avoids the homogenizing influence of formal institutions of learning and art academies."[85] "Fluxus experience" places experimentation at the center of an egalitarian educational philosophy. Following in the pragmatist tradition, the artist does not work according to fixed principles, he/she works towards them, in the hope of drawing conclusions relevant for further practical action. Art becomes a concentrated practice of interaction and improvisation in a direct response to the situation at hand—both from a social and practical task-based standpoint.

Here in the avant-garde interpretation of Dewey, after having (once polemically, now pragmatically, and then once again polemically) equated art and life, the formalisms of identity and experience can be attacked as one would attack the formalisms of art. At times remarkably simple, clear and to the point, at others struggling with unexpected contingencies and complexities, working through these

artistic and existential questions—we might begin to create different strategies of art education that could be implemented in a wide variety of contexts, in high schools, vocational schools, art schools and universities—and through this begin working on redefining the conditions of contemporary experience.

Preliminary Notes for a Program of Art Education for the 21st Century: Après Dewey

1. Learning by Doing (expanded)
One of the common phrases used to describe Dewey's educational philosophy is "learning by doing." But this should not be understood in the sense of gaining a skill through actual practice: Dewey's "learning by doing" was not a theory of how to best gain practical skills. For Dewey the philosophy of learning by doing was a process of learning about broad social, political and philosophical questions through working out very immediate problems related to practice (much like the philosophical notion of "pragmatism," "learning by doing" is too often understood in merely operational or instrumental terms).

In much the same way that learning by doing has nothing necessarily to do with skill, likewise art should not be taught merely for the sake of preparing future artists to be competent in a certain form of expression. The knowledge gathered in art-experience instead represents a critical and self-conscious approach to all human activities (pragmatist experience is always related to "doing"), which, if explored in all of their complexity, should lead us to an understanding of our place in the present social organization and even in history (here, unlike Hegelian inspired philosophies, it is important to remember that pragmatist agency is not limited to world-historical figures). In this way the goal of "learning by doing" is not only learning *how* to do something but rather the *'who, what, where, when, why'* we do something. An example based on gardening from *Democracy and Education* from 1916 (translated into German in 1930):

"Gardening, for example, need not be taught either for the sake of preparing future gardeners, or as an agreeable way of passing time. It affords an avenue of approach to knowledge of the place farming and horticulture have had in the history of the race and which they occupy in present social organization."[86]

2. Art and (the Institutionalization of) Fallibilism
There is a trajectory of art in the 20th century based on fallibilism, on the idea that all claims of knowledge, all alleged truths should be subject to scrutiny. Even though one might seek definitive knowledge, certainty, truth, etc., there can be no claim that is immune from doubt. All art that challenges accepted fundamental notions of what art is works with some level of fallibilism. What we consider, or what up until now we have considered to be art is a starting point for further fundamental inquiry and experimentation (with the results contingent upon the particular experiment at hand). Certainty in science as well as in art "blocks the road to the inquiry by which things are found out."[87] Art freed from any definite framework is methodologically and philosophically framed as a pursuit, in this case, a provisional proposition, a proposed answer to the question "what is art?" One can easily imagine John Cage reading Dewey's essay on Peirce:

"Fallibilism is also more than a necessary postulate of method. It has definite philosophical implications. It points to the continuity of all things in nature. 'The principle of continuity is the principle of fallibilism objectified.' It signifies that as our knowledge swims in a continuum of indeterminacy, so things themselves swim in continua; there are no exact breaks and divisions such as would make exact knowledge possible. Only the idea of fallibilism opens the mind to the observation of the merging edges, the fluidity of all things."[88]

It is important to remember that this is not an invitation to relativism, nor pure skepticism, but rather working with the knowledge of provisional truths (the nihilists and skeptics have stopped seeking! They already know there is no truth...).

Perhaps more importantly, beyond pure intellectual or artistic pursuit, fallibilism as a philosophical program has implications for the constitution of a democratic state. Establishing that we can never be certain of our claims, implies a willingness to listen to different and opposing views,

which, of course, is the basis of negotiating power relations within a democratic society.

Art schools and exhibition spaces are (could be, should be) institutions that are based on an understanding of the necessity of challenging the underlying assumptions and traditions not only of art, but also of society as a whole, providing an institutional space for fallibilism in theory and practice, where all symbols, images, all forms of representation and identity can be called into question—in a celebration of contingency![89]

3. Radical Pragmatism: Constructive Experience and Contingency

The philosophy of "pragmatism" has a complex history. I would try to describe it in the most basic terms possible as a philosophy that claims that knowledge and agency are inseparable, that social reality is formed through a collective construction of meaning, which in turn creates the future conditions for knowledge-agency. The constructivism of pragmatism, unlike the similar logic of certain schools of post-modernism is closer to the empiricism of the natural sciences—although the notion of experiment can also be seen in aesthetic terms. Pragmatic experience is a process of reacting and acting but also constructing forms of consciousness in an "active and alert commerce with the world [...] complete interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events."[90] In this way, pragmatist consciousness is not about representing but rather interacting or even making transactions with nature.

Perhaps most importantly, these active transactions with nature, while wholly based in a specific social reality, are contingent. Although situated in a specific time and place in a specific human community, they are always constructed—and therefore open to transformation. The contingent nature of experience is reflected in the notion of the experiment. The experiment-experience, though formulated within certain given structures, is always uncertain in outcome. Unlike more sociologically-minded traditions, existing social structures, patterns of behavior and ways of thinking are to be understood, at best, as experiments in social organization that could just as easily be conceived in entirely different terms. The pragmatist-constructivist revolution begins with the Monty Python gag "and now for something completely different..."

4. Democracy as a Form of Engagement

To what extent is education the means with which society reproduces itself? To what extent is it a challenge to given structures? Of the many dualisms that pragmatism sought to overcome: the dualisms between mind and body, between theory and practice, etc. would have to be added the underlying social dualisms of the master and slave, and of rich and poor. The Deweyian tradition would try to find a level of fundamental egalitarianism within education qua experience. First comes the fallibilist starting point—calling all certainties into question—which is crucial to avoid education becoming reproduction. Then the overcoming of the dualism of theory and practice through "learning by doing," underlined in the common interactive experience of teaching as learning and learning as teaching, and finally the stress on experience as experiment reflects a fundamental, ontological contingency—the indeterminacy of the future conditions of experience.

5. Art and the Humanities in Vocational Training

Democracy takes work. For Dewey this work begins with education, with schools cultivating freethinking and self-critical individuals—not merely the vocational and instrumental skills that are needed for a profession. In Dewey's pedagogy, broad humanities-based education and the arts would take on a central role as initiators of open processes that link immediate professional-oriented work to critical thought (see also: learning by doing). Here yet another dualism should be overcome by both vocational schools teaching humanities and art and humanities and art schools teaching vocational training (the latter case was, for example, at the core of the Black Mountain College curriculum).

The current crisis of democracy must be understood as part of a long-term crisis in funding in education and culture with roots in the cultural shift of the 1970s and 1980s. We are now living the results of neo-liberal cuts in public

education (and in the US the exploding costs of private education) coupled with the conservative preservation of cultural dominance through the continued separation of pupils into different educational paths based almost entirely on class distinctions.

This crisis has become more evident in recent years, with large voter blocks without an academic background becoming more and more enthralled with repeating the clichés of the ruling class. While the question of education and social background is of course complex, with numerous factors playing a role including property, profession, salary, future perspectives, etc. there nonetheless is such an overwhelming statistical correlation between extreme-right-wing populist tendencies and vocational training that it is long overdue to reconsider this division of education and labor—from both sides.

6. Pragmatism Vs. Neo-Conservative Thinktanks?

During the height of neo-liberal conservatism and its attacks on progressive education and art funding in the late 1980s, the political theorist Martin Walzer remarked

"The neoconservative thinktanks of the 1970s and early 1980s provide the only recent example of the unity of theory and practice. Leftist and even liberal arguments these days are largely theoretical in character: professors writing for other professors. [...] Political theory is a kind of alienated politics, an enterprise carried on at some distance from the activities to which it refers. The result, very often, is endless refinement, esoteric jargon, romantic posturing, and fierce intramural polemic."[91]

Today it increasingly appears that one of the most important ideas of pragmatism has been forgotten by progressive politics: the dichotomy of theory and practice can only be overcome through agency! The "unity of theory and practice" Walzer speaks of here has dominated policy decision-making for the past 40 years. A future progressive art education must take this situation into consideration and must work on the level of funding and policy-making to forward its goals—in addition to exploring the romantic and esoteric polemics of critical discourse and practice!

7. "...I regretted the fact that I had allowed the violence of the social world to triumph over me, as it had triumphed over him."[92]

In the epilogue of Didier Eribon's *Returning to Reims* from 2009, which traced his own intellectual and existential transformation, moving from a provincial working-class background to Paris to become a well-known sociologist and philosopher, Eribon reflects upon his relationship to his father and family and to the cultural world he had come from. Between the social precarity and intense personal challenges faced both by his parents and himself, his story unfolds within an autobiographical and discursive space. It is the story of a man reacting to his very specific personal experiences and at the same time an analysis of the "several collective determinations, and therefore 'several identities' and several forms of subjection"[93] that had shaped this experience.

The publication in 2009 of Eribon's work came at an important cultural moment, as social-democrat parties throughout Europe lost their grip on the continent's political imagination—in spite of the massive failure of investment capitalism made obvious in 2008—as large groups of people shifted their allegiance from socialist or leftist parties to voting for extreme right-wing populism— while at the same time, the artworld had perhaps never been as politically self-conscious.

In much the same way that Dewey criticized the separation of art from society, thereby creating a situation where the dominant classes were able to compartmentalize and segregate a certain kind of experience, one could also claim that the critical hermeneutics (cultural and political theory) that have developed alongside art have also been compartmentalized and removed from society at large. In the same way that the excessive concentration on the objecthood of art was related to the role art objects play in maintaining class-based society, one could argue that the academicization of art and political theory also has led to an unbridgeable gap between those "in the know" and those outside of institutions of art and higher learning. While this is a recurring theme on the left (i.e. the problem of the intellectual elite), I feel it nonetheless must be reiterated here in the

context of what I would call a “radical pragmatic” perspective. Although there is certainly never one ‘silver bullet’ argument or program that could change this dramatic and complex situation, one can find in Dewey’s work and to a certain extent in the avant-garde interpretation of his philosophy, a program of art education that could be implemented in cultural and educational institutions across the spectrum of society. In any case, rather than holding endless debates about the effects of the Bologna Process on the aristocratic art academies or the imminent threat to mythical Humboldtian ideals, it would again be necessary to think of education in broader progressive, perhaps even utopian (albeit pragmatic) terms. At the very least, education should once again be considered under experiential terms—as an experiment in learning how to live.

69 Boris Groys, “Education by Infection,” in: *Art School Propositions for the 21st Century*, ed. Steven Henry Madoff (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009), 27.

70 John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Perigee, [1934] 2005), 1. Emphasis added.

71 “As it took shape, the college became a unique combination of liberal arts school, summer camp, farm school, pioneering village, refugee center and religious retreat.” Mary Emma Harris, “Black Mountain College: European Modernism, the Experimental Spirit and the American Avant-Garde,” in: *American Art in the 20th Century*, ed. Christos Joachimides and Norman Rosenthal (Munich: Prestel, 1993), 95.

72 „Während der Zeit von 1919 bis 1933 durchliefen das Bauhaus 1287 Studierende aus 29 Staaten. Davon waren 20% Ausländer, und etwas ein Drittel war weiblich.“ Michael Siebenbrodt and Lutz Schöbe, *Bauhaus: 1919-1933* (New York: Parkstone International), 231.

73 “Albers went further to find in form an ethics of perception, which he developed in theories of progressive pedagogy concerning experimentation and social change. Drawing on the work of John Dewey, Albers presented the methodology of the experimental test as a forceful corrective against stagnant perceptual habits in the culture at large, centering attention on the tremendous stake of progressive education in combating forces of social reproduction, that is, the tendency of dominant cultural values to be reproduced as the privileged traditions of society.” Eva Díaz, “The Ethics of Perception: Josef Albers in the United States,” *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (June 2008), 260, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20619605.

74 Josef Albers, “Concerning Art Instruction,” in: *Black Mountain College Bulletin*, Series 1, No. 2 2 (Black Mountain College: North Carolina, 1934), https://monoskop.org/images/9/9c/Black_Mountain_College_1933-1934.pdf.

75 William Fetterman, *John Cage’s Theatre Pieces: Notations and Performances* (East Sussex: Psychology Press, 1996).

76 According to an interview he held in 1961, it was the “Julliard Lecture” later published in *A Year From Monday* (1964). See: William Fetterman, *John Cage’s Theatre Pieces: Notations and Performances* (1996).

77 John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 37.

78 Students of Cage at the New School lectures included George Brecht, Jim Dine, Al Hansen, Dick Higgins, Scott Hyde, Allan Kaprow, Jackson Mac Low, Larry Poons, George Segal, Florence Tarlow and 'LaMonte Young.

79 George Maciunas, in: *Ubi Fluxus ibi motus 1990-1962* (Milan: Edizioni Mazotta, 1990), 227.

80 Henry Flynt, “Mutations of the Vanguard,” in: *Ubi Fluxus ibi motus 1990-1962* (Milan: Edizioni Mazotta, 1990), 128.

81 “Such consciousness of what we do and feel each day, its relation to others' experience and to nature around us, becomes in a real way the performance of living. And the very process of paying attention to this continuum is poised on the threshold of art performance.” Allan Kaprow, *Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life*, edited by Jeff Kelley (Berkeley: UC Press), 196.

82 Jeff Kelley, “Introduction,” in: Allan Kaprow, *Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life*, xi.

83 Allan Kaprow, “Manifesto,” in: *Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life*, 82.

84 Robert Filliou, T*eaching and Learning as Performing Arts* (New York: Verlag Gebrüder König, [1970] Facsimile Reprint 2014), 12.

85 Hannah Higgins, *Fluxus Experience* (Berkeley: UC Press, 2002), 189.

86 John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: The Macmillan Company, [1916] 1931), 235. Please note that Dewey’s use of the word ‘race’ corresponds to the now outdated use meaning “people.” Dewey, as an early supporter of the N.A.A.C.P., was certainly not a racist.

87 John Dewey, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” in: *The Later Works of John Dewey*, Vol. 6, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 275.

88 John Dewey, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” 275.

89 Although, unfortunately and obviously, this is not always the case… formalisms of identity and moralism can be found everywhere.

90 John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Perigee, [1934] 2005), 18.

91 However bleak this might sound, there is hope, as Walzer continued: “Nonetheless, interesting work gets done, and if some of it is written in code, it is still possible to detect certain tendencies that may one day have practical impact.” Martin Walzer, “Introduction: The State of Political Theory,” *Dissent*. Summer 1989, 337.

92 Didier Eribon, *Returning to Reims* (Cambridge MA: Semiotext(e), 2013), 244.

93 Didier Eribon, *Returning to Reims*, 242.

Fig. 7